Colorado Supreme Court Asked to Hold Trial Judge in Contempt Part 3
Posted on: April 12, 2009 by: adminFrom Palmer v. District Court of City and County of Denver, 398 P.2d 435 (Colo. 1965) I found these quotes I hope this Court finds pertinent:
Section 19, Article II of the Colorado Constitution ordains that “all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.” The mandate of the constitutional provision is that persons charged with offenses are bailable with the one exception mentioned. [cites ommitted] The mention of the one exception excludes other exceptions. Courts would violate their mandate if they were to add another to the exception expressed in the quoted provision. Id. @ ¶ 18.
It seems like Judge DS has violated his mandate when he denies me the procedural due process prescribed by this Court C.R.C.P. 97 under Colo. Constit. Article VI § 21
As we view it, the trial court has in effect said there is a second exception: that one charged with crime becomes unbailable when he pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. This the trial court was powerless to do, and the denial of bail was erroneous in this respect. Id. @ ¶ 19.
Judge DS’s actions dismissing my appeal and my mandamus petition was in effect saying that he was not subject to this Court’s rules or prior decisions.
Continuing from the Palmer case ante we find this Court saying:
The following language used in [cite deleted] a case involving a sexual psychopath, construes a like provision of the California Constitution and is applicable to the case herein.
…The people of the State of California through their Constitution have provided in Article I, Section 6, that “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.
In a similar manner the people of the State of Colorado through their Constitution have provided in Article II § 6 that:
Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay.
and in Article II § 25 that:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
and in Article VI § 21 the people mandated that:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and shall make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases…
In making these rules, including C.R.C.P. 97, this Court has upheld that mandate saying in C.R.C.P. 1:
These rules govern the procedure in the …district court…[emphasis added]
From Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1964, on page 324 I found the definition for govern to mean in pertinent part, “…direct; control; rule; manage…to restrain; curb…to determine.”
This Court governed Judge DS’s conduct in C.R.C.P. 97 by saying:
Upon the filing by a party of such a motion all other proceedings in the case shall be suspended until a ruling is made thereon.
Continuing from the Palmer case ante we find this Court saying:
This mandate of the people cannot be legally set aside by the civil, legislative or judicial branch of the government. * * * Irrespective of the * * * personal views of an individual officer as to the wisdom of the constitutional provision such provision is binding without qualification upon the courts until the people have by inherited processes legally erased the constitutional mandate. Id. @ ¶ 22.
In like manner, Judge DS should not be allowed to set aside the rules and decisions issuing from this Court governing his conduct as a judicial officer.

![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=a905273a-54bc-46ed-881e-382b39c4c78f)